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This paper examines access to external ﬁnancing in the privatization context and provides new evidence
on the effects of ﬁnancing constraints on performance and investment. Ownership reforms increase
ﬁrms’ reliance on external ﬁnancing. Empirically, performance and investment changes around owner-
ship reforms are increasing in country-level measures of access to credit. The presence of a severe prior
public ﬁnancing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization. Privatized
enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries, all else given. Our analyses rely on new inter-
national sector- and ﬁrm-level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The relation between ownership structure and performance has
long been an important issue in theoretical and empirical corpo-
rate ﬁnance. Private ownership and ownership reforms have been
shown to improve ﬁrm performance through aligning the incen-
tives of managers and shareholders and increasing the efﬁciency
of investment decisions. A change in the sources of funding and
the extent of reliance on external ﬁnancing is an important impli-
cation of ownership reforms mostly overlooked in earlier analysis.
To our knowledge this study is the ﬁrst systematic attempt to
examine the role of access to external ﬁnancing for performance
and investment changes following privatizations. We ﬁnd a signif-
icant effect of country-level measures of access to credit on perfor-
mance and growth around ownership reforms over different time
horizons. We also ﬁnd that prior constraints are associated with
signiﬁcantly higher investment growth following ownership
changes. However, comparisons of privatized industries with sim-
ilar publicly owned industries reveal that a shift to private owner-
ship alone does not lead to better performance. Our tests employ
new international telecommunications sector data as well asll rights reserved.
: +1 585 273 1140.
ter.edu (A. Knyazeva), diana.
@columbia.edu (J. Stiglitz).ﬁrm-level data for multiple sectors, and they correct for selection
bias and endogeneity.
This paper provides novel evidence on the interaction between
operating decisions and ﬁnancing. Access to external ﬁnancing is
hypothesized to have a large effect on capital-intensive companies
that become more dependent on private funding of new invest-
ment projects after a change from public to private ownership. This
paper also sheds more light on the issue of investment and soft
budget constraints. According to a prevalent view, inefﬁcient
investment in publicly owned enterprises can be curbed by switch-
ing to a hard budget constraint under private ownership. Our ﬁnd-
ings instead underline the signiﬁcance of past ﬁnancing constraints
and increased access to external ﬁnancing for improvements in
performance and investment growth following a change from pub-
lic to private ownership.
Focusing on a sample of capital-intensive industries, we analyze
the effects of access to ﬁnancing before and after ownership
changes to distinguish between the ﬁnancing dimension and other
factors that contribute to the impact of ownership reforms on per-
formance. We examine the effects of access to external ﬁnancing
and the relaxation of prior public sector ﬁnancing constraints on
performance around ownership changes. We argue that access to
external ﬁnancing improves the ability of new owners to ﬁnance
investment projects and strengthens performance. Empirically,
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive effect of access to credit on changes
in performance and investment around ownership reforms.
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on access to ﬁnancing due to low debt capacity of the public sec-
tor experience faster investment growth after the ownership
change.
We also empirically evaluate the relative importance of access
to ﬁnancing and ownership changes for long-term performance.
Similar to Knyazeva et al. (2006), we account for selection and end-
ogeneity issues involving the ownership change decision. While
access to external ﬁnancing has a positive effect on long-term per-
formance changes, privatized industries do not perform better than
industries remaining public during the same period.
Our paper is related to existing work on institutions and
ﬁnancial development. Rajan and Zingales (1998) ﬁnd that
growth in industries dependent on external capital is higher in
countries with better capital markets. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksi-
movic (1998) conclude that ﬁrms are able to ﬁnance more
growth through external ﬁnancing in countries with better ﬁnan-
cial development and legal environment quality. Beck and Levine
(2002) demonstrate the relevance of overall ﬁnancial develop-
ment for growth and the formation of new establishments. Beck
et al. (2006) ﬁnd a positive effect of ﬁnancial intermediary devel-
opment on ﬁrm size. Unlike the cited works, this paper considers
the effects of prior ﬁnancing constraints and current access to
credit on performance around ownership changes. We ask which
of the two factors is more important for performance and how
access to external ﬁnancing interacts with major ownership
changes.
Our study also relates to the privatization literature. Existing
papers perform pre- and post-privatization comparisons and ﬁnd
positive effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on
performance (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Megginson et al.,
1994; D’Souza andMegginson, 1999; D’Souza etal., 2001; Boubakri
and Cosset, 1998; Wallsten, 2001; Bortolotti et al., 2002). For in-
stance, Boubakri et al. (2005) show post-privatization improve-
ments in efﬁciency and proﬁtability and a link among property
rights, stock market turnover, and efﬁciency gains. Similarly,
state-owned banks exhibit lower proﬁtability, efﬁciency, and asset
quality, and they engage in less prudent lending practices (Lin and
Zhang, 2009; Jia, 2009; Iannotta et al., 2007).
Unlike other work, this paper focuses on the effects of access
to credit and past ﬁnancing constraints on post-privatization per-
formance. We contribute to existing literature by showing a link
between access to external ﬁnancing, particularly through the
credit channel, and performance and investment around owner-
ship changes. Our analyses disentangle the ownership change deci-
sion, performance consequences of ownership changes, and
differences in long-term performance of publicly owned and priv-
atized industries to draw conclusions about the role of access to
ﬁnancing before and after ownership reforms for performance
and operating decisions. We also ﬁnd that privatized industries
do not outperform public sectors after controlling for endogeneity.
This paper uses a comprehensive telecommunications sector
data set. The chosen setting offers several advantages: increased
relevance of external ﬁnancing due to the industry’s capital inten-
sity, fewer concerns about the endogeneity of country-level ﬁnanc-
ing conditions to a single sector’s performance, and greater
homogeneity and comparability of data across countries. Further,
telecommunications sector ﬁndings are supplemented with ﬁrm-
level evidence obtained in a multi-sector sample. Our empirical
methodology accounts for the endogeneity of ownership reforms.
Ownership reforms trigger major shifts in the sources of fund-
ing for new projects. Our ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the role of ac-
cess to credit for post-privatization performance changes.
Recently privatized ﬁrms lack a reputation in capital markets and
face potentially signiﬁcant information asymmetries. Due to lower
information sensitivity of debt, the lending channel would appearto be an important method of accessing additional external ﬁnanc-
ing for such ﬁrms. We argue that the availability of credit has a
favorable effect on performance around ownership changes. Devel-
oped credit markets promote more efﬁcient allocation of capital to
new investment projects. Recently privatized ﬁrms that lack inter-
nal cash ﬂow to ﬁnance value-increasing projects can avoid under-
investment due to increased availability and (or) lower cost of
credit. Therefore, our ﬁrst hypothesis is that ﬁrms that switched
to private ownership exhibit stronger performance improvements
and higher investment growth in environments with better access
to bank credit.
An alternative prediction arises from the argument that ﬁnan-
cial market monitoring limits managerial slack and empire build-
ing as well as helps eliminate inefﬁcient investments undertaken
prior to privatization, resulting in better performance of bor-
rower ﬁrms. Hence, while performance would improve at a faster
rate in the presence of developed credit markets, investment
would decrease or grow more slowly. We consider the effects
of credit on performance and investment changes to distinguish
empirically between our main hypothesis and this competing
prediction.
Our second hypothesis relates ﬁnancing constraints prior to
privatization to performance changes after ownership reforms. Re-
duced borrowing capacity of the government can limit the funding
available to state-owned entities, potentially resulting in underin-
vestment in value-improving projects while the industries are pre-
dominantly publicly owned. State-owned enterprises that
experience internal cash ﬂow shortfalls have less ﬁnancial ﬂexibil-
ity if the public sector is subjected to ﬁnancing constraints. Enter-
prises that were subjected to public sector ﬁnancing constraints
prior to privatization might realize larger gains from a shift to pri-
vate ownership. They are expected to beneﬁt more from the
ﬁnancing obtained during the privatization transaction and from
raising external ﬁnancing as a privately owned company, resulting
in higher growth after the ownership reform. Previously uncon-
strained public enterprises are expected to gain less from the own-
ership change. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that
performance and investment changes around ownership reforms
are increasing in prior ﬁnancing constraint.
We also ask whether privatized industries outperform compa-
rable publicly owned industries. Several possible considerations
arise. According to the soft budget constraint argument, the switch
to private ownership increases investment efﬁciency and beneﬁts
performance by eliminating value-destroying investments.
According to an alternative view, if the costs of the reforms are fac-
tored in, privatized industries need not outperform publicly owned
industries, at least in the short to medium run (Knyazeva et al.,
2006).
However, the relation of ownership change and performance
can be confounded by the opposite effects observed for differ-
ent subsamples of privatized industries. Instead of examining
the overall effects of ownership reforms on performance, this
paper attempts to identify industries that beneﬁt from a change
to private ownership and those that fail to realize improve-
ments. For previously constrained industries, the switch to pri-
vate ownership is expected to increase access to ﬁnancing and,
by consequence, performance. Privatization need not beneﬁt
previously unconstrained enterprises. Reputation building in
capital markets takes time, while unconstrained government-
owned enterprises receive continuous funding. In addition,
undervalued deals are more vulnerable to the risk of reversal
of privatization, which increases the cost of capital (Hoff and
Stiglitz, 2004). We therefore examine subsamples based on
prior constraint, current access to external ﬁnancing, and insti-
tutional environment to disentangle the positive and negative
effects of privatization.
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describes the data and methodology. Section 3 presents the results.
Section 4 concludes.1 Access to bank credit in a given country is arguably exogenous to the performance
f a single sector or ﬁrm, whereas stock market liquidity is more likely to be affected
y countrywide share issue privatizations (Bortolotti et al., 2007).2. Data
2.1. Sample
The ﬁrst set of tests examines performance and investment
dynamics around ownership changes. We use a cross-country sam-
ple of telecommunications industry privatizations. Privatization
reform data are obtained from Guillen et al. (2004) for 1987–
1999. Certain control variable deﬁnitions require data availability
for 1982–1984. Industry performance and investment variables
are obtained from International Telecommunication Union World
Telecommunications Indicators. The second set of tests analyzes
long-term performance changes in the full sample of privatized
and publicly owned industries.
We focus on the telecommunications sector for several reasons.
First, capital intensity of the telecommunications sector heightens
the role of access to external ﬁnancing and prior ﬁnancing con-
straints for investment and performance. The ﬁndings can inform
inference about other capital-intensive industries. Second, coun-
try-level regressions of economic growth on ﬁnancial development
examined in earlier work are susceptible to causality concerns. Our
use of performance and investment data for a single sector miti-
gates the issue of endogeneity of country-level access to capital
measures. Third, data on operating decisions and performance
within a single sector are more comparable across countries.
The ﬁnal set of tests corroborates the main results in a multi-
sector sample of European privatization deals conducted in
1989–2006. Data on years of privatization and privatized stakes
are obtained from Privatization Barometer. Firm-level privatization
data are matched to Amadeus data on ﬁnancial characteristics of
privatized companies.
2.2. Variables
Telecommunications sector analyses use several dependent
variables. All variables are expressed as changes. The ﬁrst two
measures characterize growth in output and availability of service.
Total subscriber density is deﬁned as the number of total tele-
phone subscribers per hundred inhabitants. The measure accounts
for possible substitution of mobile service for ﬁxed line service.
However, it could falsely attribute the spike in phone service due
to cell phone usage to the effect of ownership reforms. Therefore,
we also use ﬁxed phone line density, deﬁned as the number of
ﬁxed lines per hundred inhabitants. The third measure is total
capacity (telephone line connective capacity scaled by population).
The fourth measure is sector investment, deﬁned as the ratio of
telecommunications investment to gross domestic product
(GDP). Due to data constraints, we resort to aggregate sector-level
data on annual investment expenditure. Given the high concentra-
tion of the telephone service industry, particularly in the immedi-
ate aftermath of ownership reforms, changes in sector investment
should be a reasonably accurate reﬂection of the trends in invest-
ment of recently privatized telecom providers. The ﬁfth measure
characterizes sector revenues (the ratio of annual telecommunica-
tions revenue to GDP).
Firm-level analyses use proﬁtability variables, including the ra-
tio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets and
proﬁt margin, to measure operating performance more directly.
One of the main explanatory variables in this study is access to
credit; particularly, bank credit. Bank credit plays a signiﬁcant role
in a number of developed countries in the sample, but especially soin countries with less developed equity markets. Recently priv-
atized enterprises are likely to face higher information asymme-
tries than companies with an established reputation in the
capital markets. Bank credit is expected to be an important method
of raising external ﬁnancing for recently privatized companies. The
bank credit measure can also be used to distinguish the main
hypothesis from the alternative soft budget constraint prediction.
As delegated monitors, banks can oversee the management to pre-
vent overinvestment. If recently privatized companies have value-
destroying investments as a result of past soft budget constraints,
bank credit should have a positive effect on performance but a neg-
ative effect on investment growth. However, if the access to exter-
nal ﬁnancing hypothesis holds, bank credit should have a positive
effect on both performance and investment. The variable is deﬁned
as the share of domestic bank credit in GDP. For robustness, we
consider the share of domestic private sector credit in GDP. We
also examine the sensitivity of access to credit results to the inclu-
sion of equity market development measures.1
Due to the scarcity of ﬁrm-level data on pre-privatization
ﬁnancing constraints, we deﬁne prior constraint based on the
past debt burden of the government. High debt levels limit the
government’s borrowing capacity and increase interest payments,
hindering the state’s ability to ﬁnance projects in capital-intensive
state-owned industries. Similar to country-level measures of
access to credit, our prior constraint variable has the advantage
of being relatively exogenous to future performance of an individ-
ual sector. The variable is deﬁned as the average share of public
and publicly guaranteed debt in GDP prior to the ownership
change. The share of external debt in GDP is used in robustness
checks. In addition, we use the presence of a sovereign debt rating
prior to privatization to proxy for past availability and cost of gov-
ernment debt ﬁnancing.
Several controls are included. Competition and the presence of
an independent regulator are expected to improve performance (
Wallsten, 2001; Li and Xu, 2004). The competition index provided
by Li and Xu (2004) and Estache and Goicoechea (2005) is a cate-
gorical variable that varies amongmonopoly, duopoly, partial com-
petition, and extensive competition. We also control for past
performance, country income, and legal origin (based on La Porta
et al., 1998). The year of privatization is included to account for
learning about privatization design and possible technological
shifts. For robustness we control for the scope of the ownership
change (full or partial privatization) to capture variation in incen-
tives. Firm-level performance analyses include controls for ﬁrm
size, the share of tangible assets in total assets, average industry
performance, the number of years since privatization, percentage
privatized, and year dummies. Because Frydman et al. (1999) ﬁnd
that privatization gains are realized with outsider but not insider
owners, we also control for post-privatization ownership structure
in ﬁrm-level tests (Amadeus). Other robustness checks introduce
controls for privatization method and value of privatization trans-
actions (World Bank Privatization Database and Privatization
Barometer). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main
variables.
2.3. Methodology
We analyze performance changes over several time horizons.
First, we examine changes in performance in the three years after
the ownership reform (years +1 to +3) relative to three years before
the ownership reform (years 3 to 1). The ownership reform year
(year 0) is excluded. Second, we analyze the effects of ownershipo
b
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mance over ﬁxed windows (1987–1989 to 2000–2002). Third, we
estimate panel data regressions of performance changes using all
available observations (without limiting the period of analysis to
three years after the reform). Panel data regressions include the
number of years since privatization to control for the time-varying
effect of past ownership changes.
If performance is persistent, some industries could systemati-
cally outperform others. To address this, we either examine
changes in performance or include ﬁxed effects and control for
average industry performance. The downside of ﬁxed effects esti-Table 1
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The sector-level sample includes telecommunications industries privatized in 1987–199
and regulation reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, andW
average performance or investment in the three years after the ownership reform relativ
100 inhabitants. Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants. C
of telecommunications investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (ITU). Revenue is
domestic bank credit to GDP), private credit (ratio of domestic private sector credit to G
(log of surface area in km2) are averaged over three years after the ownership reform (W
external debt constraint (ratio of external debt to GDP) are averaged over three years befo
per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU). Initial country income (average gross national pr
origin countries and zero otherwise), geographic latitude (absolute value of average lati
obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Competition is the index of competition in local pho
and Goicoechea, 2005). Scope of privatization is the ratio of the total value of privatizati
country GDP (%) (World Bank Privatization Database, WDI). Initial population is the avera
of budget balance to GDP (%) in 1982–1984 (WDI).
The ﬁrm-level sample includes European ﬁrms from all sectors privatized in 1989–2006
change in performance after the ownership reform relative to the three years before the
(%). Proﬁt margin is the ratio of pre-tax proﬁt to operating revenue (%). Size is log of cons
liabilities to total assets. Tangible assets is the ratio of tangible ﬁxed assets to total asset
year of privatization (Privatization Barometer). GDP growth is growth in GDP (WDI). DIn
(log) in the three years before the reform (WDI).mation is the exclusion of time-invariant characteristics such as
pre-privatization ﬁnancing constraint, legal environment quality,
and privatization method.
Sectors or ﬁrms with certain unobserved time-invariant charac-
teristics could be targeted for privatization (Gupta, 2005). Self-
selection into the ownership reform sample would preclude valid
inference. To account for this, we include a set of country-, sec-
tor-, or ﬁrm-level controls that could be correlated with post-priv-
atization performance, including initial performance. A selection
model is used to analyze performance changes after privatization.



































9 and industries remaining public with available Guillen et al. (2004) privatization
orld Development Indicators (WDI) country data. The main variable is the change in
e to the three years before the reform. Output (I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per
apacity is ﬁxed line connective capacity per 100 inhabitants. Investment is the ratio
the ratio of telecommunications revenue to GDP (%) (ITU). Access to credit (ratio of
DP), equity market cap (ratio of market capitalization to GDP), and geographic area
DI). Prior constraint (ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP) and prior
re the ownership reform (WDI). Initial output is average ﬁxed telephone line density
oduct per capita (log) in 1970–1995), French legal origin (equals one for French legal
tude, scaled to [0,1]), and Catholic religion (percentage of Catholic population) are
ne service that varies between monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004; Estache
on transactions reported in all sectors in 1990–1999 (in 1999 dollars) to year 1999
ge log of population in 1982–1984 (WDI). Initial budget balance is the average ratio
with available Privatization Barometer and Amadeus data. The main variable is the
reform. EBIT/A is the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to total assets
umer price index adjusted sales (WDI). Debt/A is the ratio of current and noncurrent
s. Transaction value is privatization transaction value as a percentage of GDP in the
come per capita is change in GDP per capita (log) relative to average GDP per capita
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privatization. The resulting estimates are consistent. Treatment ef-
fects estimation is more efﬁcient than instrumental variables esti-Table 2
Privatization decision and choice of privatization type.
Pr (Privatization) Pr (Privatization) Pr (F
I II III
Initial output 0.048* 0.080* 0.9
(0.02) (0.04) (0.31
Initial country income 0.033 0.343 3.668
(0.15) (0.22) (0.84
Geographic latitude 0.015 1.083 8.592
(0.85) (1.28) (2.35
Catholic religion 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.093
(0.0) (0.01) (0.02
French legal origin 0.817*** 0.834** 4.9
(0.26) (0.35) (1.32
Initial population 0.075 0.170** 0.989
(0.07) (0.09) (0.26
Initial budget 0.038 0.1
balance (0.03) (0.04
Number of observations 141 86 86
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.19 0.70
This table presents estimation results for the model of the privatization decision. The sam
remaining public with available Guillen et al. (2004) privatization and regulation refor
opment Indicators (WDI) country data. Columns I and II present the results of Probit est
estimation of the probability of full privatization. Column IV presents the results of Or
‘‘minority stake,” ‘‘majority stake,” and ‘‘full.” Column V presents the results of Multino
‘‘partial,” and ‘‘full.” Equation for the choice between a full and a partial privatization is r
1982–1984 (ITU). Initial country income (average gross national product per capita (log)
zero otherwise), geographic latitude (absolute value of average latitude, scaled to [0,1]),
et al. (1999). Initial population is the average log of population in 1982–1984 (WDI). Init
(GDP) (%) in 1982–1984 (WDI). Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical
Table 3
Performance around ownership changes (sectoral study).
DOutput(I) DOutput(I)
I II
Access to credit 1.900** 1.904**
(0.86) (0.93)
Prior constraint 0.098 0.136
(0.22) (0.24)
Initial output 0.085 0.098
(0.11) (0.11)
Initial country 1.350** 1.238**
income (0.54) (0.49)








French legal origin 0.042
(0.60)
Number of observations 54 54
R2 0.49 0.51
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions of changes in average industry perfo
three years before the reform. The sample includes telecommunications industries priva
reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Developm
inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (
is the ratio of telecommunications investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (ITU
credit is the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP, averaged over three years after the ow
debt to GDP, averaged over three years before the ownership reform (WDI). Initial outp
Initial country income (average gross national product per capita (log) in 1970–1995) and
are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Competition is the index of competition in loc
Estache and Goicoechea, 2005). Independent regulator equals one if an independent regu
privatization equals one if a full privatization took place and zero otherwise (Guillen et a
1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.mation. Further, as ﬁxed effects ﬁlter out unobserved group-level
heterogeneity, ﬁxed effects estimation partly addresses the endo-
geneity problem.ull privatization) Privatization type




















ple includes telecommunications industries privatized in 1987–1999 and industries
m data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Devel-
imation of the probability of privatization. Column III presents the results of Probit
dered Probit estimation of the ownership reform type that varies between ‘‘none,”
mial Probit estimation of the ownership reform type that varies between ‘‘none,”
eported. Initial output is average ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants in
in 1970–1995), French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin countries and
and Catholic religion (percentage of Catholic population) are obtained from La Porta
ial budget balance is the average ratio of budget balance to gross domestic product
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.
DOutput(II) DCapacity DInvest DRevenue
III IV V VI
3.786*** 2.972** 0.698** 0.830***
(1.12) (1.33) (0.26) (0.28)
0.277 0.144 0.357*** 0.938***
(0.45) (0.42) (0.10) (0.27)
0.167 0.114 0.130*** 0.047
(0.27) (0.15) (0.04) (0.05)
2.339* 1.850 0.508 0.143
(1.21) (0.76) (0.26) (0.31)
0.739 0.231 0.079 0.076
(0.23) (0.14) (0.04) (0.06)
0.366 1.035 0.634 1.435
(1.37) (0.93) (0.35) (0.90)
0.972 0.347 0.052 0.050
(0.61) (0.35) (0.07) (0.13)
53 50 38 38
0.49 0.51 0.39 0.58
rmance and investment in the three years after the ownership reform relative to the
tized in 1987–1999 with available Guillen et al. (2004) privatization and regulation
ent Indicators (WDI) country data. Output (I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per 100
ITU). Capacity is ﬁxed line connective capacity per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Investment
). Revenue is the ratio of telecommunications revenue to GDP (%) (ITU). Access to
nership reform (WDI). Prior constraint is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed
ut is average ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU).
French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin countries and zero otherwise)
al phone service that varies between monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004;
lator was present after privatization and zero otherwise (Guillen et al. (2004)). Full
l., 2004). Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the
Table 4
Performance around ownership changes (sectoral study): Effects of equity market development, sovereign ratings, and reform characteristics.
DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DInvest
I II III IV V
Panel A: Equity market development
Access to credit 8.251***
(2.83)
Equity market cap 4.123* 0.165
(2.07) (1.08)
Financial development index 2.994** 4.438** 0.517**
(1.45) (1.67) (0.18)
Prior constraint 0.410 0.367 0.116 1.463 0.928
(1.70) (1.96) (1.61) (4.22) (0.66)
Initial output 0.071 0.009 0.100 0.154 0.159***
(0.13) (0.21) (0.14) (0.32) (0.05)
Initial country income 1.373* 2.372** 1.296* 4.229* 0.613***
(0.73) (1.04) (0.73) (2.18) (0.21)
Year of privatization 0.260 0.337 0.349* 1.719*** 0.045
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.52) (0.04)
Independent regulator 2.510 0.428 2.408 3.798 0.929***
(1.97) (1.57) (2.45) (3.79) (0.27)
Competition 0.943** 0.601 0.751 1.997* 0.091
(0.41) (0.63) (0.48) (1.02) (0.09)
Number of observations 31 31 31 31 27
R2 0.60 0.38 0.52 0.59 0.53
DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DInvest DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DInvest
I II III IV V VI
Panel B: Sovereign ratings and cost of debt
Access to credit 2.018** 3.551*** 1.224***
(0.94) (1.31) (0.29)
Prior constraint 0.086 0.207 0.347***
(0.28) (0.49) (0.07)
Sovereign investment 0.326 4.372 0.489***
grade (1.82) (4.07) (0.16)
Borrowing cost differential 0.984 3.091 0.290**
(0.92) (3.90) (0.13)
Initial output 0.100 0.241 0.134*** 0.129** 0.204 2.8E–04
(0.11) (0.26) (0.04) (0.06) (0.23) (0.01)
Initial country income 1.361** 2.407** 0.556** 2.670** 7.956** 0.131
(0.57) (1.17) (0.27) (0.97) (3.78) (0.16)
Year of privatization 0.259* 1.220*** 0.026 0.075 3.765*** 0.011
(0.13) (0.33) (0.03) (0.26) (0.69) (0.03)
Independent regulator 0.185 0.247 0.203 2.274 3.257 0.245*
(1.05) (1.58) (0.38) (1.73) (5.00) (0.12)
Competition 0.672** 1.300** 0.118* 0.848 2.845 0.021
(0.28) (0.55) (0.06) (0.57) (1.70) (0.04)
Number of observations 49 48 37 28 28 25
R2 0.500 0.595 0.426 0.326 0.729 0.546
Panel C: Privatization reform characteristics
Access to credit 1.878** 4.637*** 0.742** 3.673** 6.672*** 0.770**
(0.91) (0.86) (0.31) (1.76) (1.91) (0.35)
Prior constraint 0.279 0.087 0.354*** 1.241 0.526 1.050*
(0.18) (0.33) (0.08) (1.53) (3.35) (0.59)
Initial output 0.046 0.071 0.128** 0.178 0.073 0.140**
(0.14) (0.26) (0.05) (0.22) (0.31) (0.05)
Initial country income 1.647** 3.676** 0.573 1.581 5.622** –0.431
(0.61) (1.46) (0.35) (0.98) (2.03) 0.251
Year of privatization 0.355** 1.513*** 0.045 0.751*** 2.431*** 0.002
(0.15) (0.35) (0.04) (0.23) (0.61) (0.04)
Scope of privatization 0.059 0.041 0.012 0.049 0.012 0.015
(0.09) (0.14) (0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.01)
Public offerings 3.421* 2.523 0.369
(1.67) (3.15) (0.39)
Direct/asset sales 1.570 5.690 0.322
(1.70) (3.36) (0.32)
Concession/leases 4.850** 7.866** 0.709*
(1.93) (3.17) (0.39)
Independent regulator 0.229 0.632 0.104 2.928 2.735 0.046
(1.02) (1.22) (0.40) (1.84) (2.29) (0.32)
Competition 0.671* 1.425** 0.076 0.814** 1.289** 0.077
(0.37) (0.68) (0.07) (0.39) (0.57) (0.09)
Number of observations 44 43 33 34 34 29
R2 0.554 0.621 0.399 0.688 0.726 0.546
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions of changes in average industry performance and investment in the three years after the ownership reform relative to the
three years before the reform. The sample includes telecommunications industries privatized in 1987–1999 with available Guillen et al. (2004) privatization and regulation
reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Development Indicators (WDI) country data. Output (I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per 100
inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Investment is the ratio of telecommunications investment to gross domestic
product (GDP) (%) (ITU). Initial output is average ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU). Access to credit (ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP),
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private credit (ratio of domestic private sector credit to GDP), and equity market cap (ratio of market capitalization to GDP) are averaged over three years after the ownership
reform (WDI). Financial development index is obtained from the factor analysis of access to credit, private sector credit, and equity market cap, which yielded a single factor
with eigenvalue above one with scoring coefﬁcients of 0.92, 0.12, and 0.06, respectively. Prior constraint is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP, averaged
over three years before the ownership reform (WDI). Sovereign investment grade equals one if the government had a Moody’s issuer rating of Baa3 or better in the three years
prior to privatization and zero if the sovereign rating was below Baa3 or the country was not rated. Borrowing cost differential is the principal-weighted average spread
between corporate bond yields and principal-weighted yield on government bonds with the same maturity and currency of issue in a given country for issues recorded in SDC
Platinum Global Issues database in the three years following privatization. The following variables are obtained from the World Bank Privatization Database: scope of
privatization (ratio of the total value of privatization transactions across all sectors reported in 1990–1999 (in 1999 dollars) to year 1999 country GDP (%)), public offerings
(proportion of telecommunications sector privatization deals undertaken through public offerings and share issues in 1990–1999), direct/asset sales (proportion of tele-
communications sector privatization deals undertaken through direct, private, negotiated, auction, or asset sales in 1990–1999), and concessions/leases (proportion of
telecommunications sector privatization deals undertaken through concessions and leases in 1990–1999). Initial country income (average gross national product per capita
(log) in 1970–1995) and French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin countries and zero otherwise) are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Competition is the index
of competition in local phone service that varies between monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005). Independent regulator equals one if an
independent regulator was present after privatization and zero otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.
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Historical performance could affect the odds of privatization. Well-
performing companies can raise more capital as part of a privatiza-
tion sale. Also, cash-strapped governments facing ﬁscal deﬁcits
could accelerate the sales of underperforming state-owned entities
(Noll (2000)). Countries with the French legal tradition tend to
have weaker shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). As a result,
governments in French legal origin countries could be more likely
to retain concentrated stakes and defer the sale of state-owned
entities to investors. Past population size and income are included
to control for country-level heterogeneity. Following La Porta et al.,
1999, we add two other proxies for exogenous country conditions:
location (log of absolute value of latitude, with higher values cor-
responding to temperate climates, which could contribute to the
formation of better institutions) and religious composition (per-
centage of Catholics as a proxy for social traditions and attitudes).
3. Results
Before turning to the analysis of performance changes, we
examine the ownership reform decision. The ownership reformTable 5
Performance around ownership changes (sectoral study): Selection model.
DOutput(I) DOutput(II)
I II
Access to credit 1.762** 3.409***
(0.88) (1.08)
Prior constraint 0.144 0.256
(0.22) (0.53)
Initial output 0.112 0.273
(0.10) (0.25)
Initial country income 1.235*** 1.840
(0.47) (1.18)
Year of privatization 0.119 0.640***
(0.08) (0.16)




Wald test 4.76** 7.73***
Number of observations 54 53
This table presents regressions of changes in average industry performance and investme
reform, estimated with correction for selection using full maximum likelihood. The sam
Guillen et al. (2004) privatization and regulation reform data, World Telecommunication
Output (I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the
connective capacity per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Investment is the ratio of telecommunica
telecommunications revenue to GDP (%) (ITU). Access to credit is the ratio of domestic ba
constraint is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP, averaged over three
line density per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU). Initial country income (average gr
(1999). Competition is the index of competition in local phone service that varies betw
Independent regulator equals one if an independent regulator was present after privatiza
output, initial population, geographic latitude, Catholic religion, initial country incom
countries and zero otherwise), geographic latitude (absolute value of average latitude, sc
from La Porta et al. (1999). Initial population is the average log of population in 1982–198
is reported. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at theprobability is predicted in Table 2 (columns I–III). As expected,
industries in French legal origin countries are signiﬁcantly less
likely to be privatized. The sign of the coefﬁcient on initial output
is negative, which suggests that governments are more willing to
privatize poorly performing enterprises. Historical average budget
balance has a negative effect on the likelihood of a full privatiza-
tion, implying that ﬁscally burdened governments are more likely
to undertake a complete transfer of ownership rights. More devel-
oped countries favor privatizations with full transfer of ownership,
all else given. Choice of the scope of ownership reforms (full,
majority stake, minority stakes, none) is modeled using Ordered
Probit and Multinomial Probit (Table 2, columns IV–V). The results
are consistent with the evidence above. All else equal, a full privati-
zation is more likely to occur in poorly performing industries;
countries with ﬁscal deﬁcits; countries with non-French legal ori-
gin; and larger, more developed economies.
We now turn to the analysis of performance after ownership re-
forms. In Table 3 we examine changes in performance and operat-
ing characteristics in the three years following privatization to
identify the determinants of successful reforms and evaluate the


















nt in the three years after the ownership reform relative to the three years before the
ple includes telecommunications industries privatized in 1987–1999 with available
Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Development Indicators (WDI) country data.
number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Capacity is ﬁxed line
tions investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (ITU). Revenue is the ratio of
nk credit to GDP, averaged over three years after the ownership reform (WDI). Prior
years before the ownership reform (WDI). Initial output is average ﬁxed telephone
oss national product per capita (log) in 1970–1995) is obtained from La Porta et al.
een monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005).
tion and zero otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). The selection equation includes initial
e, and French legal origin. French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin
aled to [0,1]), and Catholic religion (percentage of Catholic population) are obtained
4 (WDI). Wald test of the independence of the main equation and selection equation
1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.
Table 6
Performance around ownership changes (sectoral study): Fixed effects estimation.
DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DCapacity DInvest DRevenue
I II III IV V
Access to credit 3.486*** 24.878*** 5.399** 0.432*** 4.321**
(0.92) (4.12) (2.74) (0.16) (1.99)
DIncome per capita 1.696** 9.761*** 1.195 0.207 1.958
(0.71) (3.37) (1.22) (0.16) (1.46)
Years since privatization 0.847*** 2.673*** 0.935*** –0.027*** –0.182
(0.08) (0.26) (0.10) (0.01) (0.14)
Independent regulator 0.617 18.724*** 0.410 0.135* –7.479**
(0.56) (3.20) (1.33) (0.08) (3.08)
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 629 601 319 388 423
This table presents panel data regressions of changes in performance and investment of privatized industries after the ownership reform relative to the three years before the
ownership reform, estimated over 1987–2002 with the inclusion of sector ﬁxed effects. The sample includes privatized telecommunications industries with available Guillen
et al. (2004) privatization and regulation reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Development Indicators (WDI) country data. Output
(I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Capacity is ﬁxed line connective
capacity per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Investment is the ratio of telecommunications investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (ITU). Revenue is the ratio of telecom-
munications revenue to GDP (%) (ITU). Access to credit is the ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP (WDI). DIncome per capita is the change in GDP per capita (log) relative to
average GDP per capita (log) in the three years before the reform (WDI). Years since privatization is the number of years since privatization (Guillen et al., 2004). Independent
regulator equals one if an independent regulator is present and zero otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). Sector ﬁxed effects, year effects, and a control for annual consumer price
inﬂation are included but omitted from the table. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and
, respectively.
2 In an unreported test, in addition to including the year of the telecommunications
sector privatization, we control for the number of years between the ﬁrst privati-
zation transaction in the World Bank Privatization Database and the telecommuni-
cations sector privatization. The results are qualitatively similar.
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cess to credit has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on different mea-
sures of growth around ownership changes. Performance changes
around ownership reforms are less sensitive to prior public sector
constraints. The hypothesized positive effect of the prior public
sector constraint is signiﬁcant in the revenue speciﬁcation (column
VI). Furthermore, privatizations undertaken in later years are asso-
ciated with stronger performance improvements, consistent with
learning about optimal privatization design.
We next examine changes in investment (column V). Access to
credit has a positive effect on investment changes. Changes in
investment of privatized companies do not appear to be driven
by the elimination of soft budget constraints under the pressure
of ﬁnancial market discipline. Instead, recently privatized enter-
prises seem to be taking advantage of greater availability of exter-
nal ﬁnancing in environments with widespread access to credit.
Further, industries subjected to more signiﬁcant ﬁnancing con-
straints under state ownership experience larger increases in
investment after a change in ownership.
In addition to access to credit, equity market development
could inﬂuence performance after privatization. Results of the
analyses are presented in panel A of Table 4. When market capital-
ization is included jointly with access to credit, it enters with a
marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient while access to credit retains its
positive sign and signiﬁcance (column I). Multicollinearity due to
a 0.74 correlation of market capitalization and access to credit is
a potential concern. When included separately, however, market
capitalization remains insigniﬁcant (column II). We also perform
factor analysis of access to credit, private sector credit, and market
capitalization measures. The resulting ﬁnancial development index
places most of the weight on access to credit and enters with a sig-
niﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient (columns III–V). Newly privatized
ﬁrms are likely to present signiﬁcant information asymmetries to
prospective investors. Because debt is less information-sensitive
than equity, access to credit is a more signiﬁcant determinant of
performance of recently privatized sectors. We conclude that ac-
cess to credit appears to have the greatest inﬂuence on perfor-
mance, so we focus on this variable in subsequent analyses.
Tests of the prior constraint hypothesis reported in Table 3 rely
on the extent of public sector indebtedness prior to privatization.However, ﬁscally sound governments in countries with strong
growth prospects could borrow extensively yet pay a relatively
low cost of debt. As an alternative, we use the presence of an
investment grade sovereign bond rating to capture the govern-
ment’s creditworthiness as a prospective borrower. The sovereign
investment grade dummy equals one if Moody’s sovereign issuer
rating was Baa3 or above in the three years prior to privatization
and zero if the rating was lower or if the country was not rated
(Moody’s InvestorsService, 2003). If the prior constraint hypothesis
holds, post-privatization gains would be stronger in countries that
lacked a sovereign investment grade rating prior to the reform.
Consistent with earlier ﬁndings, the prior constraint effect is signif-
icant for changes in investment but not for changes in performance,
holding prior public debt levels constant (columns I–III of Table 4,
panel B). The next robustness check evaluates the potential effects
of a change from the public ﬁnancing constraint to a private sector
ﬁnancing constraint after privatization. We use weighted average
spreads between corporate and government bond yields in a given
country to proxy for potential relaxation or tightening of borrowing
constraints after the change from public to private ownership (SDC
Global Issues). High positive spreads indicate that privatized enter-
prises likely face higher borrowing costs than sovereign issuers,
which should have an adverse effect on investment and perfor-
mance. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect in the case of investment
changes but not performance changes. The additional evidence is
consistent with the ﬁndings in Table 3. Relaxation of the prior con-
straint only affects investment changes after ownership reforms.
Finally, we examine robustness of access to credit ﬁndings to
the inclusion of reform characteristics.2 The results remain qualita-
tively similar after the inclusion of the cumulative volume of privati-
zation transactions in the country and dummies for the use of public
offerings, direct or asset sales, and concessions or leases in privatiza-
tion reforms (Table 4, panel C).
The results of performance and investment regressions with
correction for selection bias are reported in Table 5. The model of
Table 7
Long-term changes in performance (sectoral study): Full sample.
DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DOutput(II) DOutput(I) DOutput(II)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Panel A: Long-term changes in performance
Access to credit 1987–1999 3.785*** 3.909*** 3.745*** 3.904***
(1.37) (1.36) (1.37) (1.37)
Access to credit 1990–1999 3.772***
(1.40)
Access to credit 1987–1989 3.659***
(1.38)
Private credit 1987–1999 4.389** 4.454**
(2.20) (2.19)
Prior constraint 0.681 1.577 1.667 0.634 1.434 0.356 1.675 1.436
(1.10) (1.10) (1.12) (1.08) (1.10) (1.08) (1.09) (1.09)
Privatization 0.564 0.560 1.677 1.363 0.677 1.497
(2.72) (2.72) (2.68) (2.78) (2.70) (2.77)
Full privatization 1.150 1.066
(2.62) (2.61)
Initial output 0.854*** 0.848*** 0.742** 0.802*** 0.848*** 0.795*** 0.860*** 0.858***
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28)
Initial country income 1.789** 1.842** 1.887** 1.912** 1.816** 1.949** 1.692** 1.727**
(0.80) (0.80) (0.83) (0.82) (0.80) (0.81) (0.80) (0.80)
Indebted 0.489 0.451 0.771 0.754 0.623 0.895 0.572 0.689
(1.09) (1.09) (1.14) (1.11) (1.08) (1.11) (1.08) (1.08)
Independent regulator 0.039 0.007 0.057 0.126 0.059 0.151 0.141 0.107
(1.07) (1.07) (1.12) (1.09) (1.06) (1.08) (1.00) (0.99)
Competition 0.291 0.291 0.040 0.140 0.293 0.140 0.232 0.248
(0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.53) (0.51) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52)
Number of observations 88 88 83 88 88 88 88 88
Access to credit 1987–
1999
Private credit 1987–1999 Prior constraint French legal origin
High Low High Low High Low Yes No
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Panel B: Long-term changes in performance (subsamples)
Effect of privatization on 2.253 0.232 1.694 0.366 3.035 2.484 0.837 1.292
DOutput(I) (3.92) (3.26) (3.69) (2.64) (3.85) (2.90) (2.76) (4.93)
Effect of privatization on 2.084 0.384 1.668 0.697 3.282 2.207 0.915 1.211
DOutput(II) (3.93) (3.18) (3.69) (2.50) (3.81) (2.89) (2.73) (4.85)
Number of observations 43 45 44 44 44 45 53 36
Panel A presents regressions of long-term changes in performance of telecommunications industries that were privatized in 1990–1999 and telecommunications industries
that remained public, estimated using treatment effects (full maximum likelihood method) to correct for the endogeneity of the ownership reform. The dependent variable is
change in average performance in 2000–2002 relative to average performance in 1987–1989. The sample includes telecommunications industries with available Guillen et al.
(2004) privatization and regulation reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Development Indicators (WDI) country data. Output (I) is
ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Access to credit is the average ratio of
domestic bank credit to gross domestic product (GDP) in 1987–1999 (columns I, V, VII, and VIII), 1990–1999 (column II), and 1987–1989 (column III) (WDI). Private credit is
the average ratio of domestic private sector credit to GDP in 1987–1999 (WDI). Prior constraint is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt to GDP in 1987–1989
(WDI). Initial output is average ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU). Initial country income (average gross national product per capita (log) in
1970–1995) is obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Indebted equals one if the country was classiﬁed by the World Bank as severely or moderately indebted in 1998 and zero
otherwise. Competition is the index of competition in local phone service that varies between monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005).
Independent regulator equals one if an independent regulator was present and zero otherwise (Guillen et al. (2004)).
The treatment effect is privatization (columns I–VI) or full privatization (columns VII–VIII). Privatization equals one if a privatization took place in 1990–1999 and zero
otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). Full privatization equals one if a full privatization took place in 1990–1999 and zero otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). The privatization decision
is predicted with initial output, initial population, geographic latitude, Catholic religion, and French legal origin. Initial output is deﬁned above. Initial population is the
average log of population in 1982–1984 (WDI). French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin countries and zero otherwise), geographic latitude (absolute value of
average latitude, scaled to [0,1]), and Catholic religion (percentage of Catholic population) are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999).
Panel B presents the results of estimating the speciﬁcations of columns I and V of panel A in subsamples deﬁned as follows: access to credit 1987–1999 above or below sample
median (columns I–II); private credit above or below sample median (columns III–IV); prior constraint above or below sample median (columns V–VI); French legal origin
equals one or zero (columns VII–VIII). Variables used to deﬁne subsamples are excluded from respective speciﬁcations.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.
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Similar to previous tables, we consider changes in performance in
the three years after the ownership reform compared with average
performance in the three years before the reform.
The signs of coefﬁcients of interest are consistent with previ-
ously presented ordinary least squares evidence. Access to credit
has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on performance and invest-
ment changes. Gains in performance and investment from better
access to credit are generated already in the ﬁrst three years after
the ownership change. Investment changes remain positively cor-
related with prior constraint, indicating that previously con-
strained industries increase investment at a faster rate after the
switch to private ownership.Tests presented in the previous tables use differences in average
performance before and after the ownership change, resulting in
cross-sectional regressions with one observation per sector. We
depart from this variable construction approach in Table 6, which
presents ﬁxed effects estimation results using an unbalanced panel
of changes in performance and investment following ownership
reforms. Fixed effects estimation partly mitigates selection bias
by controlling for unobservable time-invariant cross-sectional
heterogeneity associated with the likelihood of privatization.
Dependent variables are adjusted for the pre-privatization average
but are allowed to vary over time. Due to the inclusion of ﬁxed
effects, time-invariant measures such as prior constraint are omit-
ted. In all speciﬁcations, access to credit facilitates improvements
Table 8
Performance around ownership changes (sectoral study): Selection model robustness checks.
DOutput(I) DOutput(I) DOutput(II) DOutput(II) DInvest DInvest
I II III IV V VI
Access to credit 1.940 3.525 0.664
(0.80) (1.05) (0.29)
Private credit 2.377 5.327 0.589
(1.21) (1.94) (0.25)
Prior constraint 0.596 0.670 0.441
(0.295) (0.85) (0.179)
Prior external debt 0.003 0.281 0.388
constraint (0.196) (0.50) (0.134)
Initial output 0.017 0.141 0.133 0.271 0.149 0.126
(0.14) (0.10) (0.34) (0.25) (0.05) (0.04)
Initial country income 1.238 1.054 1.824 1.811 0.480 0.496
(0.52) (0.46) (1.14) (1.15) (0.22) (0.27)
Year of privatization 0.054 0.108 0.551 0.645 0.072 0.075
(0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.04)
Independent regulator 0.356 0.181 0.086
(0.85) (1.21) (0.37)
Semi-autonomous 1.037 1.607 0.442
regulator (0.83) (1.47) (0.29)
Competition 0.413 0.487 0.619 0.753 0.010 0.031
(0.26) (0.25) (0.58) (0.52) (0.06) (0.07)
Geographic latitude 4.254 6.323 0.726
(3.59) (8.23) (0.52)
Geographic area 0.133 0.135 0.138 0.175 0.014 0.023
(0.14) (0.10) (0.36) (0.26) (0.05) (0.05)
Wald test 7.64 3.91 9.1 7.56 2.83 1.31
Number of observations 54 54 53 53 38 38
This table presents regressions of changes in average industry performance and investment in the three years after the ownership reform relative to the three years before the
reform, estimated with correction for selection using full maximum likelihood. The sample includes telecommunications industries privatized in 1987–1999 with available
Guillen et al. (2004) privatization and regulation reform data, World Telecommunication Indicators (ITU) sector data, and World Development Indicators (WDI) country data.
Output (I) is ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Output (II) is the number of telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (ITU). Investment is the ratio of
telecommunications investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (%) (ITU). Access to credit (ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP), private credit (ratio of domestic private
sector credit to GDP), and geographic area (log of surface area in km2) are averaged over three years after the ownership reform (WDI). Prior constraint (ratio of public and
publicly guaranteed debt to GDP) and prior external debt constraint (ratio of external debt to GDP) are averaged over three years before the ownership reform (WDI). Initial
output is average ﬁxed telephone line density per 100 inhabitants in 1982–1984 (ITU). Initial country income (average gross national product per capita (log) in 1970–1995)
and geographic latitude (absolute value of average latitude, scaled to [0,1]) are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Year of privatization is the year of the privatization reform
(Guillen et al., 2004). Independent (semi-autonomous) regulator equals one if an independent (semi-autonomous) regulator was present after privatization and zero
otherwise (Guillen et al., 2004). Competition is the index of competition in local phone service that varies between monopoly and competition (Li and Xu, 2004; Estache and
Goicoechea, 2005). The selection equation includes initial output, initial population, geographic latitude, Catholic religion, initial country income, and French legal origin.
Initial population is the average log of population in 1982–1984 (WDI). French legal origin (equals one for French legal origin countries and zero otherwise) and Catholic
religion (percentage of Catholic population) are obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). Wald test of the independence of the main equation and selection equation is reported.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with , , and , respectively.
3 In an unreported test, we exclude countries with investment-grade ratings in
1987-1989 from the full sample, but the privatization effect remains insigniﬁcant.
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ﬁndings in the previous tables.
Next, we analyze the effects of privatization and access to
ﬁnancing on long-term changes in performance in the full sample
that includes both privatized and publicly owned industries (Table
7). Access to credit, measured over different time periods (1987–
1999, 1990–1999, and 1987–1989), has a positive effect on long-
term performance changes, which is consistent with the role of ac-
cess to credit for performance improvements among privatized
industries. Industries in severely indebted countries experience
setbacks in performance. This full sample effect is not surprising:
Publicly owned industries suffer from the government’s limited
ability to borrow, whereas the effect of prior constraint on the per-
formance of privatized industries was not found to be signiﬁcant.
Initial output and country income are positively associated with
subsequent growth in output.
Coefﬁcients on the privatization and full privatization variables
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Although ownership reforms are
accompanied by signiﬁcant performance increases, the ownership
change sample on average does not outperform the sample of pub-
licly owned industries, all else equal. Our results lend support to
the view that the cost of ownership reforms should be traded off
against performance gains due to strengthened incentives and
other improvements. The substitution of guaranteed government
ﬁnancing for the need to raise ﬁnancing from banks and private
investors (initially without a strong reputation in external capitalmarkets) could prevent privatized entities from fully capitalizing
on improvements in incentives. Costs of private ﬁnancing also
are higher if the risk of privatization reversal (future nationaliza-
tion of the privatized company) is not trivial. Finally, previously
unconstrained ﬁrms could experience little improvement in access
to capital after privatization.
To identify industries that were most affected by ownership
changes, we divide the full sample into subsamples based on ac-
cess to credit, prior constraints, and legal origin (panel B of Table
7). Industries that enjoy better credit access after privatization
are expected to beneﬁt more from the ownership change, and vice
versa. However, the privatization effect remains insigniﬁcant
across the different subsamples.3 Further, institutional barriers to
shareholder rights as well as potential risks to property rights (such
as privatization reversals) are expected to be higher in French legal
origin environments (La Porta etal., 1998). Boubakri et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that the negative effect of government ownership is mitigated by the
presence of sound institutions. The effect of ownership reforms on
performance is insigniﬁcant in both subsamples. A similar pattern
is observed in the subsamples based on prior constraint.
Further robustness checks verify the sensitivity of the main per-
formance results to alternative deﬁnitions of the main variables
and the inclusion of additional controls (Table 8).
Table 9
Performance around ownership changes (multi-sector study): Fixed effects estimation on ﬁrm-level data.
DEBIT/A DEBIT/A DEBIT/A (Telecoms) DProﬁt margin DEBIT/A DEBIT/A DEBIT/A
I II III IV V VI VII
Panel A: The role of access to ﬁnancing
Industry performance 1.240** 1.233** 1.474*** 1.098*** 1.231** 0.976* 0.964*
(0.49) (0.49) (0.39) (0.15) (0.49) (0.54) (0.54)
GDP growth 0.161 0.049 2.038* 0.442 0.261 0.382 0.281
(0.75) (0.75) (1.15) (0.58) (0.75) (0.85) (0.84)
DIncome per capita 13.128 11.849 65.056*** 16.841 10.228 14.060 13.945
(20.68) (21.32) (22.96) (16.18) (20.05) (21.42) (22.25)
Years since privatization 0.614 1.078 0.617 1.742 0.935 2.556 2.866
(1.78) (1.81) (1.30) (1.41) (1.81) (2.08) (2.12)
Size 2.219*** 2.114*** 1.603** 0.734 2.263*** 6.101*** 5.917**
(0.82) (0.81) (0.62) (1.18) (0.83) (2.37) (2.35)
Tangible assets 5.499 5.416 17.219** 15.387** 5.405 15.553 15.168
(3.87) (3.84) (7.18) (6.35) (3.90) (10.36) (10.27)
Access to credit 22.683** 22.222*** 17.482** 23.083** 23.971**
(10.12) (8.35) (8.84) (10.27) (12.06)
Private credit 25.396** 24.629**
(10.58) (11.89)




Percent privatized 0.096 0.070 0.027 0.101 0.092 0.095 0.070
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Number of observations 945 945 85 792 945 859 859
DEBIT/A DEBIT/A DEBIT/A DEBIT/A
I II III IV
Panel B: Additional tests (controls for transaction characteristics and ownership structure)
Industry performance 0.909 0.891 0.890* 0.875*
(0.60) (0.61) (0.49) (0.49)
GDP growth 0.659 0.798 0.186 0.264
(1.04) (1.05) (0.81) (0.81)
DIncome per capita 20.520 23.034 33.475 35.479*
(24.55) (25.65) (20.65) (21.22)
Years since privatization 3.035 3.182 2.773*** 2.882***
(2.34) (2.34) (0.91) (0.94)
Size 2.879*** 2.800** 1.437*** 1.414***
(1.11) (1.10) (0.53) (0.52)
Tangible assets 26.147** 26.181** 15.960 15.825
(12.99) (12.96) (10.22) (10.19)
Access to credit 29.921** 25.968**
(14.74) (12.36)
Private credit 27.394** 25.065**
(13.78) (11.68)
Public offering 1.548 1.590
(3.37) (3.36)
Transaction value 4.201** 4.221**
(2.03) (2.01)
Ownership (ﬁnancials) 0.250** 0.251**
(0.10) (0.10)
Ownership (corporate) 0.156* 0.158*
(0.08) (0.08)
Ownership (funds) 0.093 0.098
(0.09) (0.09)
Ownership (foreign) 0.062 0.063
(0.04) (0.04)
Ownership (individuals 0.129 0.134
and employees) (0.08) (0.08)
Percent privatized 0.142** 0.142**
(0.06) (0.06)
Number of observations 729 729 854 854
This table presents regressions of changes in ﬁrm-level performance after the ownership reform relative to the three years before the reform. The sample includes European
ﬁrms from all sectors privatized in 1989–2006 with available Privatization Barometer and Amadeus data. Panel A presents ﬁrm ﬁxed effects regressions. Panel B presents
ordinary least squares regressions with country and industry effects. EBIT/A is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets (%). Proﬁt margin is the ratio
of pre-tax proﬁt to operating revenue (%). Access to credit is the ratio of domestic bank credit to gross domestic product (GDP) (WDI). Private credit is the ratio of domestic
private sector credit to GDP (WDI). Equity market cap is the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (WDI). Industry performance is the two-digit standard industrial
classiﬁcation industry average of the dependent variable, computed across all countries. Size is log of consumer price index adjusted sales (WDI). Tangible assets is the ratio of
tangible ﬁxed assets to total assets. Debt/A is the ratio of current and noncurrent liabilities to total assets. The following variables are obtained from Privatization Barometer:
years since privatization (number of years since privatization), percent privatized (percent of the ﬁrm value that was privatized), transaction value (privatization transaction
value as a percentage of GDP in the year of privatization), and public offering (equals one if the privatization sale method is a public offering and zero if privatization method
is a private sale). GDP growth (growth in GDP) and DIncome per capita (change in GDP per capita (log) relative to average GDP per capita (log) in the three years before the
reform) are obtained from WDI. Ownership structure variables represent percentage stakes held in the privatized ﬁrm after privatization by ﬁnancial institutions, nonﬁ-
nancial corporations, investment and pension funds and foundations, individuals and employees, and foreign owners, respectively (Amadeus Ownership). Year effects (and
year of privatization in columns I–II of panel B) are included. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted with
, , and , respectively.
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check using private sector credit. Private sector credit enters with a
signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient, as expected. An alternative measure
of prior public sector constraint, ratio of external debt to GDP, en-
ters signiﬁcantly in the investment growth regression. Previously
constrained industries exhibit signiﬁcantly higher investment
growth after privatization.
The results presented so far were based on telecommunications
sector data. While this research design has clear advantages, the
last set of tests extends the sample to incorporate all sectors. We
also reﬁne the deﬁnitions of the dependent variables to focus on
ﬁrm-level measures of proﬁtability, which could offer another
dimension of performance not captured in the preceding analysis.
Firm-level results are reported in Table 9. Firm ﬁxed effects and
year effects are included. Proﬁtability measures are adjusted for
average proﬁtability in the three years prior to the ﬁrst reported
ownership change.
Access to credit contributes to higher proﬁtability. A 10% in-
crease in bank credit as a share of GDP is associated with 2.3% high-
er proﬁtability changes among privatized companies. The effect
continues to hold when the sample is restricted to telecommunica-
tions companies and when the dependent variable is replaced with
the change in the proﬁt margin. The privatized percentage stake
does not enter signiﬁcantly, consistent with the evidence pre-
sented in Table 7. Other controls, such as industry performance
and size, enter with expected signs.
In columns V–VII of panel A, we account for the role of equity
ﬁnancing for ﬁrm-level performance. As in sector-level analyses,
access to credit retains its signiﬁcant positive effect but market
capitalization is not signiﬁcant. In addition, we control for leverage
deﬁned as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (columns VI–
VII). Although this variable could be endogenous, there is a positive
association between ﬁrm performance and reliance on equity
capital, consistent with prior work (Lang et al., 1996).
The use of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in panel A of Table 9 controls for
time-invariant ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Therefore, time-invariant
controls are omitted. In panel B of Table 9, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are re-
placed with country and industry ﬁxed effects, and time-invariant
privatization transaction characteristics (the value sold as a per-
centage of GDP and privatization sale method, identiﬁed as public
offering or private sale in Privatization Barometer) are introduced.
Higher transaction values are associated with better subsequent
performance. After the introduction of the controls, the privatized
stake coefﬁcient becomes signiﬁcant, which indicates that the per-
formance of privatized companies is increasing in the stake sold
although privatization itself is not associated with better perfor-
mance (columns I–II). Further, access to credit results continue to
hold after the inclusion of controls for post-privatization owner-
ship structure. Stakes by ﬁnancial institutions and nonﬁnancial
corporate owners enter with negative coefﬁcients. Foreign owner-
ship has a positive effect, and ownership by individuals and
employees has a negative effect, although both coefﬁcients are
not statistically signiﬁcant (columns III–IV).
4. Conclusion
The performance and growth implications of access to ﬁnancing
are examined in the context of major ownership changes. This pa-
per offers new evidence on the effects of ﬁnancing constraints, ac-
cess to credit, and the performance-ownership relation around
large changes in ownership in the course of ownership reforms.
Our hypotheses address two issues: the impact of access to credit
on performance and investment decisions following ownership
changes and the implications of borrowing constraints faced by
the public sector prior to the change in ownership for subsequent
growth. The main ﬁndings are as follows.First, access to credit facilitates performance improvements and
investment growth following ownership reforms. Bank lending in
particular is key to growth in investment, capacity, output, and
proﬁtability among recently privatized enterprises. Second, prior
public sector ﬁnancing constraint has a signiﬁcant positive effect
on investment around ownership changes. Previously constrained
industries grow faster following a move to private ownership
and relaxation of ﬁnancing restrictions than their unconstrained
counterparts. Third, the ownership reform sample fails to outper-
form the sample of publicly owned industries. The effect of owner-
ship reforms remains insigniﬁcant also when conditions such as
ﬁnancial development, legal environment, and prior borrowing
constraints are taken into account.
Our empirical analysis employs a comprehensive international
telecommunications sector data set, which offers several advanta-
ges: broad country representation, relevance of access to ﬁnancing
due to capital intensity of the chosen industry, and homogeneity in
the measurement of operating characteristics. Further, compared
with aggregate economic outcomes, growth and performance
changes in a single sector are less likely to drive country-level
credit development, mitigating reverse causality concerns. A sec-
ond set of tests uses a multi-sector sample of European privatiza-
tions to examine the effects of access to credit on ﬁrm
performance around ownership changes. The empirical methodol-
ogy accounts for the endogeneity of ownership reforms using a
privatization decision model as well as ﬁxed effects.
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